Philosophy of AI

A sustained argument about intelligence, knowledge, self-reference, consciousness, embodiment, feeling, and the ethical consequences of building minds organised differently from our own. The series moves from what outside observers attribute to artificial systems, inward through representation, knowledge, self-reference, architecture, embodiment, and feeling, to moral consequence -- later pages rely on distinctions developed earlier, though each page is written to stand on its own. No single test or theory settles whether a system thinks, knows, experiences, or suffers: different questions call for behavioural evidence, architectural evidence, formal argument, or philosophical interpretation, and each page is explicit about which kind it is offering.

I. Intelligence, Representation, and Evaluation

What Is the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence?

A thermostat holds a target temperature, measures the room against it, and switches the heating on or off to close the gap. Ordinary language barely resists describing this as the thermostat "wanting" the room warmer…

The Deception Criterion

Turing's 1950 paper proposes a replacement for the question "can machines think?" — a question he considered too vague to be worth answering directly. In its place: an interrogator, conversing by teleprinter with a…

Margaret Boden and AI as a Science of Mind

A program trained on a large corpus of poetry generates a stanza no human wrote, scanning correctly, using an unexpected but apt metaphor, submitted anonymously to a competition and shortlisted before anyone involved…

Intentionality: What Makes a State About Something?

A weather vane turns to face the wind. A thermostat's bimetallic strip bends with temperature. A sentence, "it's windy today," is also reliably produced when it's windy. All three co-vary with some state of the world in…

II. Knowledge, Experience, and Reality

Knowledge Without a Knower? Machine Epistemology

A language model states a wrong date with exactly the same fluent confidence it states a correct one. The usual word for this, hallucination, names the output but not the actual problem. The actual problem is a mismatch…

Empiricism, Rationalism, and Machine Learning

Train a model on nothing but examples, with no hand-written rules, and it looks like the empiricist's dream made literal: a mind built entirely from experience, Locke's blank slate finally realised in silicon rather…

III. Self-Reference and the Distributed Mind

The System That Cannot Complete Its Own Portrait

Ask a sufficiently capable reasoning system to produce a complete account of its own reasoning and certify, using only its own resources, that the account is accurate. This looks like an engineering target — more…

The Distributed Mind: Intelligence as Managed Plurality

The previous page ruled out something: a sufficiently rich reasoner cannot produce a complete, internally certified, infallible account of itself. This page asks what's left to do instead, and the answer isn't "give up…

IV. Brains, Bodies, and Worlds

V. Feeling and Moral Consequence

Artificial Colleagues, Tools, and Persons

A spreadsheet is a tool: nobody apologises to it, consults it about how it feels regarding a proposed change, or wonders whether it should be credited as a co-author. A long-serving human colleague is, among other…

Could an Artificial Mind Suffer?

This page closes the series deliberately without a verdict. Its job is narrower and more useful than settling whether any current system suffers: to separate the rungs of a ladder that discussions of machine suffering…

Afterword

What the Preceding Pages Make Me Think About

The pages in this series were written to clarify distinctions rather than settle arguments. If they have done that job well, they should leave a reader with more questions than they arrived with, not fewer. What follows…